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INTRODUCTION
Express sequence tags (ESTs) are “tiny portion[s] of an
entire gene that can be used to help identify unknown genes
and to map their positions within a genome.” 1 In layman’s
terms, an EST is simply a copy of one part of a gene. Since
proteins play crucial roles in diseases and genes code for
proteins, using ESTs to identify genes is a powerful method of
studying diseases. A recent point of controversy surrounding
ESTs is whether or not they should be patentable.
In re Fisher 2 addresses this very question. In Fisher, the
court addressed the standard of usefulness required for
patentable inventions under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as applied to
ESTs.
The Fisher court considered whether ESTs
corresponding to genes of an unknown function are capable of
satisfying the utility requirement. The Fisher court ultimately
found that the claimed ESTs lacked specific and substantial
utility because they were “only tools to be used along the way
in the search for a practical utility” and, therefore, lacked an
“immediate, well-defined, real world benefit” requisite to a
finding of “substantial” utility considered mandatory under 35
U.S.C. § 101. 3
This Note first asks whether ESTs should be patentable
and then analyzes the viability of the current utility
requirement of the Patent Act 4 as applied to ESTs. The
Background section gives an overview of the requirements for
patentability, the evolution of judicial interpretations of the
utility requirement for patentability, and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s (USPTO) interpretation of the utility
requirement as embodied in its revised Guidelines manual. 5
Next, this Note analyzes the reasoning in Fisher and
addresses whether the Fisher decision and current
patentability requirements are in line with the goals of the
patent system. This Note concludes that the current test for
utility of ESTs fails because it is unviable in its application to
research tools and inconsistent with the general goals of the

1. Nat’l Ctr. For Biotech. Info., Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to
the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (Revised Mar. 29, 2004).
2. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3. Id. at 1376.
4. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (2000).
5. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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patent system. A new, bright-line test should be adopted in its
place, which alters the substantiality prong of the test in its
application to research tools. Such a test would promote the
goals of the patent system and encourage the “progress of
science” 6 by allowing more research tools to qualify for
patents.
I. BACKGROUND
A. UTILITY REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by
securing . . . exclusive Right[s] to . . . Discoveries.” 7 This
declaration expressly limits the congressional grant of patents
to useful discoveries and is the basis for the statutory utility
requirement for patents. 8 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, patents may
be granted for inventions that involve patentable subject
matter 9 and are useful, 10 non-obvious, 11 novel, 12 and
adequately disclosed. 13 Section 101 codifies the utility prong
of the patentability requirements, stating, “[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .” 14
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF UTILITY REQUIREMENT
Courts first interpreted the statutory utility requirement
in Lowell v. Lewis. 15 In Lowell, Justice Story (while riding
circuit) adopted a de minimus view of utility and a
correspondingly low threshold for patentability, allowing
patents for compounds with no specific utility as long as they

6.
7.
8.
1991).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.
See, e.g., Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir.
The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Id.
Id. § 103.
Id. § 102.
Id. § 112.
Id. § 101.
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817).
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were “more or less usefu[l].” 16 The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA) later established the requirement of
utility for chemical compounds, holding that a patent
application must include an “assertion of utility and an
indication of the use or uses intended.” 17 This test was
softened when the court subsequently held that if actual
utility exists, the degree to which it exists is “unimportant.” 18
The modern utility standard was established in 1966 by
the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson. 19 In Brenner, the
Court narrowed what it perceived to be an overly broad field
for patentability and created a more rigorous test that
required an applicant to disclose one specific and substantial
utility that qualifies under the USPTO’s Utility Examination
Guidelines. 20 The Brenner test remains the standard applied
by courts today in determining the utility of inventions. 21
The Brenner standard was adapted to its current form in
In re Kirk 22 and In re Joly, 23 which were decided on the same
day. Kirk extended Brenner to apply not only to the process
that yielded unpatentable product, but also to intermediates
in the production of compounds with no known use. The court
additionally found that the specificity requirement is not met
if an application vaguely asserts that a compound is useful for
its “biological activity” where “one skilled in the art would
know how to use the compounds . . . to take advantage of their
presently-existing biological activity.” 24 In Joly, the majority
came to a similar conclusion as the Kirk court, holding that a
claimed use for a chemical compound as an intermediate to
make other compounds without regard for the usefulness of
the downstream compounds was inadequate to establish

16. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
17. In re Brenner, 182 F.2d 216, 217 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (emphasis omitted).
18. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 179 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
19. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
20. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
21. See, e.g., Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[I]t is well established that a patent may not be granted to an
invention unless substantial or practical utility for the invention has been
discovered or disclosed.”); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (finding
that intermediate compounds that produce other compounds with no known
use do not satisfy the utility requirement).
22. Kirk involved an application alleging compounds useful for biological
activity that someone skilled in the art could discern. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 93646.
23. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
24. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 941.
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utility. 25
C. USPTO’S INTERPRETATION OF THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT
The USPTO has published utility guidelines and training
materials that outline patentability requirements. 26 These
guidelines do not carry precedential weight, but they are
regularly relied upon by the courts when analyzing
patentability. 27
In 1995, the USPTO published the Utility Examination
Guidelines. 28 These Guidelines made it easier to patent ESTs
because they required that an applicant assert only a utility
that was “specific” and “credible,” eliminating the requirement
that the utility also be “substantial.” The USPTO clarified its
stance on patents for ESTs in 1997, declaring that failure to
specify the function of the underlying gene from which that
EST was derived was not a bar to patentability because ESTs
had utility apart from the full-length genomic DNA sequences
from which they were derived. 29
The USPTO changed its mind in 1999 when it issued its
Revised Interim Utility Guidelines, which were intended to
restrict the issuance of gene patents in response to substantial
criticism from the public and private sectors. 30 The revised
directives established a heightened standard for utility under
the “credible utility” test, so that “credible utility” was not
sufficient without an additional showing of “specific” and
“substantial” utility. 31
25. Joly, 376 F.2d at 908 (emphasis omitted).
26. See generally Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 5 at 1092;
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2004).
27. The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 26, and
Utility Guidelines, supra note 5, are not binding on a court, but they may be
given judicial notice to the extent that they do not conflict with patent
statutes. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
28. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263, 36,264
(July 14, 1995).
29. Posting of Donald Zuhn, In re Fisher: EST Patentability Redux,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2005/05/post.html (May 2, 2005). See
generally Donald L. Zuhn, DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility
Requirement, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973 (2001).
30. See Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines; Request for
Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71, 440 (Dec. 21, 1999).
31. Revised Utility Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999). See
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In 2001, the USPTO issued its current version of the
Utility Examination Guidelines.
These Guidelines
incorporated the same definitions of “specific,” “substantial”
and “credible” that were used in the 1999 Guidelines, except
that the 2001 Guidelines adopted a “specific, substantial, and
credible” test that incorporated a “well-established utility”
analysis that was previously a separate test for utility. 32
Therefore, if an invention lacks specific, substantial, and
credible utility it fails under both tests. An assertion is
credible unless “the logic underlying the assertion is seriously
flawed” or “the facts upon which the assertion is based are
inconsistent with the logic underlying the assertion.” 33 This is
not a significant hurdle to satisfy the utility requirement. The
more substantial requirements are those which require that
the utility be “specific,” which means that it is specific to the
subject matter claimed in the application, and “substantial,”
which means that it has a “real world” use. 34
Court precedent has favored a narrow interpretation of
the utility requirement following the Supreme Court’s Brenner
decision. 35 This has been followed by the USPTO in its most
Whether this is an appropriate
recent Guidelines. 36
interpretation, specifically with regard to express sequence
tags, remains an open question.
D. WHAT ARE ESTS?
In order to understand ESTs, it is important to have a
basic understanding of genetics and how genetic research is
used to study hereditary diseases. The human body is made

Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 96-97 (2000) (concluding that the
Revised Utility Guidelines address more specifically the issues of specific and
substantial utility, while keeping the same standard for credible utility from
the 1995 Guidelines).
32. The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2001); see Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1092 (Jan, 5, 2001).
33. Id. See also UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 5 (1991)
[hereinafter TRAINING MATERIALS].
34. TRAINING MATERIALS at 5-6.
35. See In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (denying a patent
application for an intermediate compound in the production of a steroid); see
also In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 936 (denying a patent application that contained
vague claims asserting “biological activity” as the utility).
36. Utility Examination Guidelines 6, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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up of many different types of cells, each of which contains
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which guides the activities
within that cell and determines the unique traits of that cell.
DNA is composed of four distinct bases, which are the
molecules adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine
(T). These bases form base pairs (A with T and G with C) that
form a two-stranded DNA molecule. Long sequences of
double-stranded DNA comprise the total DNA of a cell, called
its genome, which includes up to three billion bases in human
cells. 37 Genes are sequences of bases within a cell’s DNA 38
that give instructions to the cell on how to make proteins. 39
The different proteins encoded by genes are essential for the
survival of an organism because they perform most functions
necessary for life and make up most of the structures in a cell.
Genes, in turn, are significant because they determine the
chemistry and behavior of these proteins.
When scientists are able to understand how a gene is
expressed 40 under normal circumstances (when a person is
healthy), they can then study how it is expressed under
abnormal circumstances (when a person has a disease). In the
past, this usually required scientists to identify a protein of
interest, isolate that protein, determine its function, and then
find the specific gene within the genome that coded for that
protein. 41 Alternatively, by starting research with the gene
instead of the protein, scientists could determine the location
of a given gene on the genome and then isolate the protein
coded for by that gene. 42 Both of these methods are time37. Office of Biological & Envtl. Research, U.S. Dep’t of Energy Office of
Sci., The Science Behind the Human Genome,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/info.shtml
(last modified Aug. 29, 2006).
38. Id. It is estimated that the human genome contains 20,000 to 25,000
different genes.
39. Id. DNA sequences coding for genes comprise only 2% of the human
genome. The remainder consists of non-coding regions, which may provide
instructions for regulating protein quantities or ensure structural integrity of
chromosomes.
40. Wikipedia, Gene Expression, avaialable at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gene_expression (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
Gene expression is the process whereby a gene is “turned on” so that the
expressed portions of a gene’s DNA sequence are “converted into the
structures and functions of a cell.” In contrast, the non-protein encoding
portions are not translated into protein.
41. Office of Biological & Envtl. Research, supra note 37.
42. Id.
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consuming 43 and costly, because they require expensive
biochemical research methods and focus on only a single gene
or protein at a time. 44
Express sequence tags can decrease the time and cost
involved in genetic research. According to the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), express sequence tags are “unique
segment[s] of cDNA with a base sequence[s] identical to at
least part of the coding region of a gene, generally used as
landmark for mapping.” 45 In order to get a hold of these gene
fragments, scientists must first separate the expressed
sequences, which represent just 2% of the genome, from the
non-expressed DNA in the genome, which represents the other
98% of the cell’s DNA. 46 This is a process that naturally
occurs in the cell when messenger RNA (mRNA) is created
along the pathway to protein formation. Messenger RNA is an
alternative form of DNA that represents only the expressed
portion of DNA and is used by the cell to create proteins in a
process called translation. 47 Messenger RNA is not used
extensively in genetic research because it is inherently
unstable outside of a cell. 48 Instead, scientists use enzymes to
create cDNA from the mRNA that represents an exact replica
of the cell’s original DNA, minus the unexpressed regions.49 It
43. In fact, these methods often take years. Id.
44. EST sequences “can be generated rapidly and inexpensively, only one
sequencing experiment is needed per each cDNA generated, and they do not
have to be checked for sequencing errors because mistakes do not prevent
identification of the gene from which the EST was derived.” Nat’l Ctr. for
Biotech. Info., supra note 1.
45. Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism of the Nat’l Insts. of
Health, Concepts and Terms in Genetic Research—A Primer,
http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh26-3/165-171.htm (Prepared June,
2003).
46. Office of Biological & Envtl. Research, supra note 37.
47. Creating proteins from genes in DNA involves transcription, which is
the creation of messenger RNA from DNA, followed by translation, which is
the creation of a protein from the messenger RNA. “During [transcription],
mRNA passes through various phases, including one called splicing, where
the non-coding sequences are eliminated. In the next step, translation, the
mRNA guides the synthesis of the protein by adding amino acids, one by one,
as dictated by the DNA and represented by the mRNA.” Nat’l Ctr. for
Biotech. Info., supra note 1.
48. Id.
49. Id. According to the National Center for Biotechnology Information,
cDNA is a “form of DNA prepared in the laboratory using an enzyme called
reverse transcriptase. cDNA production is the reverse of the usual process of
transcription in cells because the procedure uses mRNA as a template rather
than DNA. Unlike genomic DNA, cDNA contains only expressed DNA
sequences, or exons.” Id.
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is this cDNA that is used in the creation of ESTs.
To create an EST, scientists isolate the cDNA that codes
for a given protein and determine its sequence (the sequence
of A, T, G, and C bases that make up the cDNA). 50 Then they
create a short sequence of bases, usually several hundred
bases long, that complements either the beginning of the
cDNA sequence (a 5’ EST tag) or the end of the cDNA
sequence (a 3’ EST tag). 51 A 5’ EST tags the portion of the
cDNA that usually codes for a protein, while a 3’ EST tags the
portion of the cDNA that is often part of an untranslated
region. 52 To study a genetic disease, scientists identify ESTs
that may correspond to a gene involved in the disease, and
then examine the DNA of disease-carrying patients for
mutations in the gene to determine if they match. 53 Other
uses for ESTs include genome mapping, the process of creating
an outline of identified genes in the human genome used by
researchers to facilitate further research and understanding of
the genome that often uses 3’ EST tags. 54
II. THE “SUBSTANTIAL” AND “SPECIFIC” UTILITY TEST
A. THE CURRENT UTILITY TEST UNDER BRENNER V. MANSON
The current test for utility was created by the Supreme
Court in 1966 in its decision in Brenner v. Manson. 55 In
Brenner the Court addressed whether the utility of a
compound produced by a chemical process is an essential
element of establishing a prima facie case for patentability of
that process. 56 The Court construed 35 U.S.C. § 101 narrowly
in its application for method patents and held that utility is
required for the product of a process as well as the process
itself:
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Nat’l Center for Biotech. Info., Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to
the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, ESTs: Gene Discovery Made Easier,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (Revised March 29,
2004). This is the method used to determine the genes involved in
Alzheimer’s disease and colon cancer, among others.
54. Id. 3’ EST tags are used for genome mapping because they are
usually not conserved between species and thus represent unique identifiers.
55. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 519.
56. Id. at 520.
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We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although
Congress intended that no patent be granted on a chemical
compound whose sole ‘utility’ consists of its potential role as an
object of use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to apply to
the process which yielded the unpatentable product. 57

The Brenner majority reasoned that the patentable field
would be too broad with a standard that did not require utility
Consequently, the
for both the process and product. 58
majority opined that the current de minimis utility standard 59
was out of line with the goals of the patent system because “a
patent is not a hunting license . . . [or] a reward for the search,
but compensation for its successful conclusion.” 60
The Brenner Court created a new test that put at its
forefront the requirement that a patentable invention derive
some benefit to the public that has “substantial utility” and a
“specific benefit [that] exists in currently available form.”61
Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not delineate what
constitutes “specific” and “substantial” in determining
whether an invention satisfies the utility requirement.
Instead, the task of interpreting this test was left to appellate
courts and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
to determine in subsequent cases.
B. “SUBSTANTIAL” UTILITY PRONG
The Brenner test’s “substantial” utility requirement has
been interpreted by the lower courts to require “practical
utility” and “real world” utility. 62 In Nelson v. Bowler, the
court elucidated the requirement by explaining that,
“‘[p]ractical utility’ is a shorthand way of attributing ‘realworld’ value to claimed subject matter. In other words, one
skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner

57. Id. at 535.
58. The Brenner Court reasoned: “Until the process claim has been
reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds
of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a
vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.” Id. at 534.
59. The utility test used before Brenner v. Manson was that outlined in
Lowell v. Lewis, where Justice Story held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 only requires
that an invention not be frivolous or injurious to well-being, good policy, or
the good morals of society. 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No.
8568).
60. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536.
61. Id. at 534-35.
62. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1376-77 (Fed.Cir. 2005).
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which provides some immediate benefit to the public.” 63 In
addition to providing an immediate benefit to the public, the
practical or real world utility must be in current form,
showing a “significant and presently available benefit to the
public.” 64
To assert utility for a method for making a corresponding
product, such as a protein, under Brenner one must determine
whether or not the corresponding product itself has
substantial utility. 65 According to the USPTO’s interpretation
of Brenner as embodied in the Utility Guidelines, identifying
and studying the properties of the corresponding product does
not constitute a “real world” context of use. 66 Therefore, the
substantial utility test encompasses the requirement for a
“real world” context of use that includes an immediate public
benefit that is currently available as disclosed in the patent
application.
C. “SPECIFIC” UTILITY PRONG
To satisfy the “specific” utility prong of the utility test, an
application must “disclose a use which is not so vague as to be
meaningless.” 67 There must be a “well-defined and particular
Vague assertions of “biological
benefit to the public.” 68
activity” 69 or “biological properties” 70 do not meet the
standard. In its non-binding Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP), the USPTO defined specific utility to
require a use particular to the subject matter claimed in the
application and not applicable to a broad class of inventions. 71
In contrast, general utility would apply to a broad class of an
63. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
64. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
65. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REVISED INTERIM UTILITY
GUIDELINES
TRAINING
MATERIALS
50-53
(1999),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf.
66. Id. at 6. According to the USPTO Utility Guidelines, “[u]tilities that
require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or reasonably
confirm a ‘real world’ context of use are not substantial utilities.” Id.
67. Fisher, 421 F.2d at 1371.
68. Id.
69. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
70. Id.
71. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2107.01 (8th ed., 5th rev. 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r5_2100.pdf [hereinafter
MPEP].
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invention. 72 An example the USPTO gives to clarify this is
directly applicable to ESTs: “a claim to a polynucleotide whose
use is disclosed simply as a ‘gene probe’ or ‘chromosome
marker’ would not be considered to be specific in the absence
of a disclosure of a specific DNA target.” 73 Further, the Utility
Guidelines addresses the utility of hypothetical cDNA
fragments used as probes for finding full-length genes and
concludes that the utility lacks specificity because,
[t]he use of the claimed nucleic acid is not particular to the sequence
being claimed because it would be applicable to the general class of
cDNAs. Any partial nucleic acid prepared from any cDNA may be
used as a probe in the preparation and or identification of a fulllength cDNA. 74

Therefore, to satisfy the specificity prong of the utility test
an application must contain an asserted use that is specific
enough that it cannot apply generally to an entire class of
invention.
III. THE FISHER DECISIONS
A. EX PARTE FISHER DECISION
In Ex parte Fisher 75 the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)
heard an appeal from an examiner’s rejection for lack of
utility 76 of a patent application claiming “[a] substantially
purified nucleic acid molecule that encodes a maize protein or
fragment thereof comprising a nucleic acid sequence” selected
from a group of five claimed ESTs. 77 The patent application
asserted the following seven uses 78 for the claimed ESTs:
1.

Serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire

72. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 51.
75. 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (B.P.A.I. 2004).
76. Whether a patent application discloses the requisite utility for a
claimed invention is a question of fact. 35 U.S.C. § 101 n.333. A patent
application that lacks utility also fails, as matter of law, for lack of
enablement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 n.12, 112 n.4. See also In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Obviously, if a claimed invention does not have
utility, the specification cannot enable one to use it.”).
77. The original application claimed 32,236 ESTs, but this was reduced
to five claimed ESTs at the direction of the USPTO examiner, who upon
examination for the merits entered a Restriction to reduce the claimed ESTs
to five or fewer. 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1022.
78. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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maize genome, which consists of ten chromosomes that
collectively encompass about 50,000 genes;
2.

Measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue sample via
microarray technology to provide information about gene
expression; 79

3.

Providing source for primers for use in the polymerase
chain reaction [PCR] process
to enable rapid and
inexpensive duplication of specific genes; 80

4.

Identifying the presence or absence of a polymorphism; 81

5.

Isolating promoters 82 via chromosome walking; 83

6.

Controlling protein expression; and

7.

Locating genetic molecules of other plants and organisms.

Although the Appellants asserted seven potential uses for
ESTs, the application needed to disclose only a single specific
and substantial utility in order to satisfy the utility
requirement. 84

79. Nat’l Center for Biotech. Info. supra note 1. Microarrays, also known
as DNA on a chip, are, “a tool for analyzing gene expression that consists of a
small membrane or glass slide containing samples of many genes arranged in
a regular pattern.” Specifically, it works by using an mRNA molecule to
hybridize with the DNA template from which it originated. This allows
researchers to determine the expression levels of many genes at once by
measuring the amount of mRNA bound to each site on the array.
80. PCR is a molecular biology technique used to replicate DNA
exponentially. PCR typically amplifies short pieces of DNA, up to ten kilo
base pairs in length.
Wikipedia, Polymerase Chain Reaction,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymerase_chain_reaction (last visited Apr. 18,
2007).
81. In the field of biology, a polymorphism refers to having multiple
alleles of a gene within a population, usually expressing different
phenotypes.
Wikipedia,
Polymorphism,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymorphism (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
82. “In genetics, a promoter is a DNA sequence that enables a gene to be
transcribed. The promoter is recognized by RNA polymerase, which then
initiates transcription. In RNA synthesis, promoters are a means to
demarcate which genes should be used for messenger RNA creation - and, by
extension, control which proteins the cell manufactures.”
Wikipedia,
Promoter, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Promoter (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
83. Chromosome walking is a method in genetics for identifying and
sequencing long parts of a DNA strand, e.g., a chromosome. As the
traditional chain termination method does not allow long DNA strands to be
sequenced, this method works by dividing the long sequence into several
consecutive short ones . . . That way, the short part of the long DNA that is
sequenced keeps ‘walking’ along the sequence. The method can be used to
sequence entire chromosomes (thus, chromosome walking). Wikipedia,
Chromosome Walking, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chromosome_walking
(last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
84. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (2001). The
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In analyzing the utility of the claimed ESTs, the BPAI
focused primarily on three of the asserted uses: identifying a
polymorphism, the use as a probe to isolate promoters, and the
use as a source for primers. 85 The court held that identifying
a polymorphism, which claimants asserted was useful in
identifying a common genetic heritage among populations,
was indeed a use for the ESTs, but that the use failed to be
substantial enough 86 because it provided only the “barest
information” about genetic heritage. 87 With regards to the
claimed use of ESTs as probes or primers, the court found that
the ESTs were not “tissue specific, cell-specific, cell-type,
developmental or environmentally regulated” 88 because the
cDNA library used to isolate the ESTs was not a subtractive
cDNA library 89 specific to portions of the genome actually
expressed in leaf tissue during anthesis. 90 In other words, the
court found the claimed ESTs to be “randomly selected” 91 so
that there was no reasonable expectation that they could
fulfill the claimed specific use in their currently available form

Guidelines state that the patentee is “required to disclose only one utility,
that is, teach others how to use the invention in at least one way. The
patentee is not required to disclose all possible uses, but promoting the
subsequent discovery of other uses is one of the benefits of the patent
system.”
85. Ex parte Fisher, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1026 (2004). The BPAI
combined the latter two uses, those of ESTs as probes and primers, under a
single analysis. In reviewing the court’s analysis, this Note also combines
the two uses into a single analysis for the sake of clarity.
86. Id. The Ex parte Fisher court concluded that polymorphisms are
natural variations that do not have an independent meaningful use and,
therefore, a correct analysis would require first determining if there was a
polymorphism and then determining “how to use this information in a
patentably meaningful way.”
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1027.
89. A subtractive cDNA library is one which has effectively eliminated
(“subtracted”) the cDNA from parts of the genome not of interest. In the case
of Fisher’s claimed ESTs, a subtractive cDNA library could subtract nucleic
acid molecules from other, non-leaf maize tissue or from other developmental
stages to leave only cDNA from maize leaf tissue from the anthesis
developmental stage. Id.
90. Id. Appellants argued that the claimed ESTs, which were isolated
from maize leaves during anthesis, provided a useful starting point for
isolating a promoter active in leaves during anthesis and that this
constituted a substantial use because isolation of the promoter would allow
research into protein expression during a developmental stage in the leaf life
cycle, including proteins that provide disease resistance.
91. Id.
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without being further “refined and developed.” 92 Therefore,
each use analyzed by the BPAI was rejected for failing the
“substantial” use prong of the Brenner utility test.
B. THE IN RE FISHER MAJORITY’S ANALYSIS: ESTS AS
RESEARCH INTERMEDIATES
In In re Fisher, the Federal Circuit heard the appeal of
the BPAI decision finding that that the claimed uses for ESTs
failed for lack of utility under the Brenner standard. 93 The
majority of the Federal Circuit found that the ESTs are “no
more than research intermediates” that can be used to identify
the underlying genes and conduct further research on those
genes. 94 The Federal Circuit held that ESTs, as research
intermediates, fail the utility standard because there is “no
assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the
end.” 95
1. “Substantial” Use
The court agreed with the Appellants that the seven
asserted uses in the application were valid experimentation
goals for ESTs, but found that there was no satisfactory
evidence that the claimed ESTs could actually be used in the
seven ways outlined in the patent application. 96 The ESTs
failed to satisfy the Brenner utility standard because they
remained “object[s] of use-testing” 97 without any current realworld utility.
Most of the claimed uses for ESTs involved studying other
molecules. 98 The majority advanced the BPAI’s utility inquiry
by exploring not only whether the claimed uses satisfied the
utility standard, but whether the products associated with the
ESTs (i.e., the underlying gene corresponding to the EST, the
protein expressed by the underlying gene, or the promoter
that an EST could locate) satisfied the utility standard
92. Id.
93. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
94. Id. at 1373.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1373–74. The Court of Appeals found that there was no
evidence showing that any polymorphisms, any promoters, or any genetic
molecules in other plants or organisms had been identified, or that the ESTs
had been used as molecular markers in maize genome mapping.
97. Id. at 1374; Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535.
98. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376.

EWING L. In Re Fisher: Denial of Patents for ESTs Signals Deeper Problems in the Utility
Prong for Patentability. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;8(2):645-680.

2007]

IN RE FISHER: DENIAL OF PATENTS FOR ESTS

661

independently. 99 Under Brenner, a useful process must yield
a product that independently satisfies the utility test. 100
Therefore, if an EST is useful because it can identify an
underlying gene, then that underlying gene must have a
specific and substantial use itself. Similarly, if an EST is
useful because it can identify a promoter or polymorphism,
then that promoter or polymorphism must also have a specific
and substantial use. The majority applied Brenner and found
that products of processes or experiments identified as uses for
ESTs must themselves have a use that satisfies the utility
standard. 101 For Fisher’s claimed ESTs, the court determined
that the underlying genes, the corresponding promoters, and
the associated polymorphisms failed to satisfy the utility
standard. 102 Therefore, the ESTs failed the utility test for
lack of substantial use.
2. “Specific” Use
The Fisher majority found that the claimed ESTs also
failed the “specific” use prong of the Brenner utility test. 103
The court determined that the asserted uses were general in
nature rather than specific to the ESTs in the application (i.e.,
the exact nucleotide sequence of each EST identified) and
therefore failed for lack of specificity. 104 The court reasoned
that:
[A]ny EST transcribed from any gene in the maize genome may be a
molecular marker or a source for primers. Likewise, any EST
transcribed from any gene in the maize genome may be used to
measure the level of mRNA in a tissue sample, identify the presence
or absence of a polymorphism, isolate promoters, control protein
expression, or locate genetic molecules of other plants and
organisms. 105

The court determined that nothing about the asserted
uses for the five claimed ESTs made them distinct “from the
more than 32,000 ESTs disclosed in the . . . application or

99. See id. at 1374.
100. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
101. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373–76. As an example, the court
illustrated that an EST may be used to detect a complementary genetic
sequence of DNA, but it is unable by itself “to provide any information about
the overall structure let alone the function of the underlying gene.” Id. at
1373.
102. Id. at 1373.
103. Id. at 1374.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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indeed from any EST derived from any organism.” 106 Fisher’s
ESTs failed the specificity test because they were general,
rather than specific, in nature and they could apply to “any
EST transcribed from any gene in the maize genome.” 107
The court again extended the analysis to address the
utility of the products associated with the claimed ESTs. In
analyzing the specific utility of the products correlated with
the ESTs, the court relied heavily on In re Kirk. 108 Kirk
extended Brenner to apply not only to processes that yielded
unpatentable product, but to intermediates in the production
of compounds with no known use. 109 Under Kirk, a compound
that is useful as an intermediate step in the preparation of
compounds of unknown use fails to have specific utility. 110 “It
is not enough that the specification discloses that the
intermediate exists and that it ‘works,’ reacts, or can be used
to produce some intended product of no known use.” 111
Therefore, under this expanded test the ESTs would remain
subject to the Brenner test even if they did not constitute a
“process” because they qualify as intermediates in the
production of compounds with no known use. Applying the
test to the claimed ESTs as intermediate compounds, the court
held that they lacked specificity because they disclosed
products of unknown use (i.e., there was no known specific use
for the underlying gene or protein it encoded). 112
C. THE IN RE FISHER DISSENT’S ANALYSIS: ESTS AS RESEARCH
TOOLS
Judge Rader dissented from the Fisher majority,
disagreeing with the identification of ESTs as research
intermediates. 113 Instead, he argued that ESTs constitute

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). See also In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (adopting the reasoning of the In re Kirk court to nearly
identical facts); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1374–77 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
109. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945–46.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 945. The court went on to comment that it is not enough that
“the product disclosed [is] obtained from [an] intermediate [that] belongs to
some class of compounds which now is, or in the future might be, the subject
of research to determine some specific use.” Id. at 945 (footnote omitted).
112. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375–77.
113. See id. at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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research tools, which have utility that is “generally . . . beyond
question” 114 in a utility analysis by the USPTO. Judge Rader
agreed with the majority that if the Brenner test applied to
ESTs (i.e., if ESTs are methods rather than research tools)
that the ESTs would fail to be patentable for lack of utility.115
There is currently no bright line test to determine what
constitutes a research tool. The USPTO has not explicitly
defined what constitutes a research tool, although it restricts
what constitutes a research tool by preventing patents for
tools that do not provide “substantial” advances. 116 Janice
Mueller, in an article about patent infringement for
biomedical research tools, defined research tools as “the many
varied resources used by scientists to conduct research and
development of new drugs, therapies, diagnostic methods, and
other therapeutic products.” 117 Research tools may include
biochemicals, such as reagents, plasmids, antibodies, and
enzymes used to develop subsequent pharmaceutical end
products or they may include a device that can be used and
reused during the course of research, such as PCR. 118 The
NIH defines research tools as “the full range of tools that
scientists use in the laboratory, including cell lines,
monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones
and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory
equipment and machines.” 119
The dissent in Fisher adopted this same broad definition
of research tools. Opining that ESTs constitute research tools,
Judge Rader argued that although the ESTs in the application
corresponded to genes of unknown function, the ESTs
nonetheless remain research tools because they “enhance
research” into “isolating and studying other molecules” 120 by
taking a researcher “one step closer to identifying and
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See MPEP, supra note 71, § 2107.01.
117. Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
118. Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the
Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 348 (2004).
119. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources:
Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
120. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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understanding a previously unknown and invisible
structure.” 121 Rader’s dissent concluded that ESTs qualify as
research tools which have established utility in a laboratory
research setting, and that the strict Brenner utility test was
therefore inapplicable. 122
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE FISHER: A BETTER
UTILITY TEST IS NEEDED
A. THE BRENNER TEST IS ILL-SUITED FOR DETERMINING
UTILITY
The Brenner utility test fails to meet the needs of modern
scientific research. There are practical problems with the
application of a rule that lacks bright-line standards 123 for
satisfying its individual prongs and policy problems associated
with a rule that was created during a time before the advent
of modern molecular genomics. The greatest problem with the
test is not the specificity prong, which rightly requires an
invention to have a specific, rather than general, application;
it is the vague and poorly applied substantial utility prong,
which lacks relevance in contemporary scientific research.
In the wake of Brenner, courts have interpreted
“substantial” as requiring “one skilled in the art” to be able to
use the discovery, in its currently available form, in a manner
providing an “immediate benefit to the public.” 124 If the
Fisher court’s interpretation of this rule is correct, in that an
invention has utility only if the studied object is
understandable using the claimed invention, then “only the
final step of a lengthy incremental research inquiry gets
protection.” 125 This standard is unrealistic for researchrelated inventions, which by their very nature encompass

121. Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 1379–82 (Rader, J., dissenting).
123. The practical problems associated with the Brenner rule were
predicted by Judge Rich, dissenting in Kirk:
But then we come to the practical problem posed by the rule being
promulgated by the majority—a rule of great vagueness and no
definite limits by reason of reliance on the terms “practical,”
“substantial,” “specific,” and “currently available.” They are nothing
but trouble-makers, as time will amply demonstrate.
376 F.2d 936, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting).
124. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
125. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J. dissenting).
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research into the unknown. For research-related inventions,
the public benefits from the research as it is conducted
because each incremental step brings a scientist closer to an
ultimately large discovery. This does not mean that the
incremental step is insignificant or lacking a benefit to society.
To the contrary, “[e]ach step, even if small in isolation, is
nonetheless a benefit to society sufficient to give a viable
research tool ‘utility’ under § 101 . . . [because even]
experiments that fail still serve to eliminate some possibilities
and provide information to the research process.” 126 Under
the current reasoning, the requirement of an immediate public
benefit would have precluded many important past inventions
simply because the public benefit was not in currently
available form. 127
The current substantial utility prong requires an inquiry
into whether or not a product corresponding to the claimed
invention itself has substantial utility. 128 In creating this
requirement, the Brenner Court reasoned that without this
virtual fence in place, the monopoly created by a patent would
have no identifiable boundaries, that it could be “vast” and
unknowable. 129 This argument lacks validity because process
claims are not denied based on whether or not what they
produce may ultimately cause a monopoly that is greater than
expected, since “a hundred more uses may be found after a

126. Id. at 1381 (Rader, J., dissenting).
127. This was noted by Justice Rich, who dissented to the majority’s
denial of a patent for lack of utility in In re Joly:
It is fortunate indeed that such a view did not prevail in the past.
Under such a test I seriously doubt whether the present majority
would find the first powered flight of the Wright Brothers to be
“useful.” Since it lasted but 12 seconds, traversed but 120 feet, and
reached a maximum height of but 10 feet, it cannot be said to have
had a “practical” or “substantial” utility or that it made powered
flight practical or substantial in a then “currently available form.”
Under the majority view such a flight would indeed be “useless.”
376 F.2d 906, 917 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
128. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 50–53 (1999),
available at www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf.
129. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not
capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and
perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block
off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating
benefit to the public.
Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
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patent is granted and greatly enhance its value.” 130 The
Brenner court also justified this requirement by describing a
useful product as the “basic quid pro quo” 131 for a patent, a
reward for the “successful conclusion” of the search for an
This argument; however, “beg[s] the very
invention. 132
question whether the process is ‘useful’ simply because it
facilitates further research into possible product uses.” 133
The current utility prong qualifies what constitutes
substantial utility as only that which has a “real world”
context, which does not include identifying and studying the
properties of a product corresponding to an invention. 134 The
reasoning behind this requirement, created by Brenner and
reinforced by Kirk, is that “a method of producing a compound
with no known use has no more benefit to society than the
useless compound itself.” 135 This is not always true in
contemporary scientific research. A research method that
involves identifying and studying properties of products
corresponding to an invention, such as studying the
underlying gene and encoded protein associated with an EST,
has a “real world” context: increasing the overall
understanding of that product (i.e., increasing the overall
understanding of the maize genome via research into the
underlying gene and its unknown gene products). Although
this may not have been foreseeable at the time of Brenner, in
contemporary science a “real world” context is present even
with a conceivably small increase in understanding because of
the fast-paced and interdisciplinary nature of research.
Another problem with the substantial use prong of the
utility test is that it is vague and open to subjective bias. This
was elucidated in Ex parte Fisher, where the court noted that,
[s]omewhere between having no knowledge (the presence
circumstances) and having complete knowledge of the gene and its
role in the plant’s development and/or phenotype lies the line
between “utility” and “substantial utility.” We need not draw the line

130. Id. at 537 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 536.
133. Id. at 537 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 50–53. According to
the USPTO Utility Guidelines, “[u]tilities [that] require or constitute
carrying out further research to identify or reasonably confirm a ‘real world’
context of use” are not substantial utilities. Id. at 52–53.
135. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
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or further define it in this case because the facts in this case
represent the lowest end of the spectrum, i.e., an insubstantial
use. 136

There is no bright-line test for courts to use in
interpreting exactly where on the spectrum a given invention
may lie. A test needs to be created because there is the
temptation for courts to not elucidate their reasoning in
determining where on the spectrum a given invention may
reside. For example, in Ex parte Fisher the court concluded
that Fisher’s invention was on the lowest end of the spectrum,
but failed to clarify why this was so. A clarified substantiality
test would preclude the temptation for courts to make
conclusions without illuminating their reasoning while also
promoting consistency in judicial decision-making.
B. AN APPROPRIATE UTILITY TEST COINCIDES WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT,
AND GOALS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing . . .
exclusive Right[s] to . . . Discoveries.” 137 Any law, judicial
decision, or USPTO guideline must satisfy this constitutional
requirement. With the advent of modern science, just what
constitutes progress has been difficult to determine and
controversial. As the dissenting Judge noted in Brenner,
[t]o encourage one chemist or research facility to invent and
disseminate new processes and products may be vital to progress,
although the product or process be without “utility” . . . because that
discovery permits someone else to take a further but perhaps less
difficult step leading to a commercially useful item. 138

Determining what constitutes “Progress of Science” was
difficult when the founding fathers created the Intellectual
Property Clause 139 and remains open to interpretation
today, 140 so that it is of little help in formulating a valid utility
136. Ex parte Fisher, 72 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1020, 1026 (Bd. Pat. App. Int. 2004).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
138. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 539 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
140. Thomas Jefferson wrote: “Considering the exclusive right to
invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I
know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those
which are not.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug.
13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333–35 (Andrew
A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905), available at
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test.
Statutory language and congressional intent provide more
guidance in creating an appropriate utility test for
patentability. The utility standard for patentability originated
with the Patent Act of 1790, which used the term “useful.” 141
The Brenner court noted the problem with the vagueness of
this term:
Even if we knew precisely what Congress meant in 1790 when it
devised the “new and useful” phraseology and in subsequent reenactments of the test, we should have difficulty in applying it in the
context of contemporary chemistry where research is as
comprehensive as man’s grasp and where little or nothing is wholly
beyond the pale of “utility”—if that word is given its broadest
reach. 142

The congressional intent behind the current statute 143 is
clearer because it was based in part on the Supreme Court
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 144 which codified the
Court decision so that patentable subject matter includes
“anything under the sun that is made by man.” 145 Clearly this
tends towards a view of the patent system favoring the
granting of patents to inventors for a broad range of
inventions.
A proper utility test must adhere to constitutional and
statutory requirements, but it should also promote the general
goals of the patent system. These goals are to reward an
inventor for his contribution to society and to increase the
public good with inventions. U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer correctly concluded that patent law should
encourage useful discovery and disclosure without unduly restricting
the dissemination of those discoveries, hindering the circulation of
important scientific ideas, or scattering ownership to the point
where it inhibits the use of the underlying genetic advance. 146

The difficulty arises in balancing the interests of the
public against those of the inventor. The theory behind
patents for inventions is that inventions promote the public

http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
141. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (Apr. 10, 1790).
142. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 530.
143. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
144. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
145. S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2394,
2399.
146. Stephen G. Breyer, Genetic Advances and Legal Institutions, 28 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 23, 27 (2000).
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good by enhancing the quality of life (e.g., with medicines to
combat disease, machines to perform labor) and that
inventors, because of their contribution to the public good,
deserve to be rewarded for their contribution to society with a
patent that confers a monopoly on that invention for a limited
time. 147 The patent encourages innovation (and therefore
increases the public good) by rewarding the inventor for his
toil. When the monopoly conferred to the inventor is too
broad, it limits the public good (e.g., by increasing the cost to
the public of using the invention or preventing other inventors
from using the invention as a means to create newer, better
inventions). The fear is that “[s]uch a patent may confer
power to block off whole areas of scientific development,
without
compensating
benefit
to
the
public.” 148
Correspondingly, if a patent is too narrow or not allowed at
all, a researcher may be discouraged from conducting
research.
V. A REVISED UTILITY TEST
A. THE PROPOSED REVISION TO THE UTILITY TEST: AN
ALTERED “SUBSTANTIAL” USE PRONG FOR RESEARCH TOOLS
1. Is it a Research Tool?
The current utility test for patentability should be revised
in its application to research tools. In a revised utility test for
research tools, the first consideration should be whether a
given invention qualifies as a research tool. As mentioned
previously, there are presently no guidelines to determine
whether or not a given invention qualifies as a research tool.
This is because such a distinction is irrelevant with the
current utility test.
The Fisher dissent loosely defines
research tools as inventions that “enhance research,” but this
is too broad and would provide little guidance. 149 A better
definition would use factors similar to those outlined by the

147. Patents “encourage dissemination of information concerning
discoveries and inventions.” Brenner, 383 U.S. at 533 (citing Universal Oil
Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (“As a reward for
inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his
invention a trade secret.”)).
148. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
149. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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NIH in considering whether a resource fits the definition of a
research tool:
1.

The primary usefulness of the resource has as a tool for
discovery rather than an FDA-approved product or integral
component of such a product;

2.

Whether the resource is a broad, enabling invention that
will be useful to many scientists . . . rather than a project or
product-specific resource; and

3.

Whether the resource is readily useable or distributable as
a tool rather than the situation where private sector
involvement is necessary or the most expedient means for
developing or distributing the resource. 150

These factors provide a good starting point for
determining whether an invention is a research tool, but they
need not be exhaustive. It is, however, important that any
definition adopted for research tools be able to readily
distinguish between inventions, and aid in consistent judicial
determinations.
Determining whether or not an invention is a research
tool does not conclude the revised utility test. The property of
being a research tool is not a utility in and of itself. The
USPTO warns that “[a]n assessment that focuses on whether
an invention is useful only in a research setting thus does not
address whether the invention is in fact ‘useful’ in a patent
The invention must still have specific and
sense.” 151
substantial use, but what constitutes substantial use should
be different for an invention that is a research tool.
2. Is the Use Substantial?
The substantiality prong should be altered for inquiries
regarding research tools. A research tool should satisfy the
substantiality prong even if it does not provide a traditionally
recognized “immediate benefit to the public” 152 in its currently
available form. This relaxed standard would recognize that
“[s]cience always advances in small incremental steps” 153 and
that the public may benefit from each incremental step.
Further, it should be irrelevant for research tools whether the
product corresponding to the research tool itself has
150.
1999).
151.
152.
153.

NIH Principles and Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,094 (Dec. 23,
MPEP, supra note 71, § 2107.01.
Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380.
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substantial utility. Only the research tool itself should have
required utility. This recognizes that while the research
process typically involves many unfruitful products before a
fruitful product, this nonetheless does not negate the value of
the process itself because “experiments that fail still serve to
eliminate some possibilities and provide information to the
research process.” 154 A “real world” context of use that
excludes “[b]asic research such as studying the properties of
the claimed product itself or the mechanism in which the
material is involved” 155 should not be expressly excluded from
potential patentability. Instead, basic research using research
tools that are themselves the subject of the research should be
patentable if they have a “real world” use in a research or
laboratory setting.
3. Is the Use Specific?
The revised utility test for research tools should remain
the same with regards to the test for specificity and would
require a specific, as opposed to general, assertion of utility.
This specific utility can be hypothetical, but it cannot be so
hypothetical so as to be general. A specific use does not
necessarily negate a hypothetical use, especially with regards
to research tools where a use may be known to exist (and
therefore not general in nature) but may not actually have
been carried out fully (and thus still technically hypothetical).
B. APPLICATION OF REVISED UTILITY TEST TO ESTS
Under the revised utility test, Fisher’s claimed ESTs
qualify as research tools. Applying the NIH factors, Fisher’s
ESTs are “tool[s] for discovery” that are useful in gaining
understanding about the maize genome and the proteins
encoded by the genes within that genome. The specific ESTs
claimed are product-specific resources because they apply to
specific underlying genes within the maize genome. ESTs, as
a group, constitute a “broad, enabling invention that will be
useful to many scientists” because ESTs can be used in many
research contexts to better understand the genome of any
species of interest. Further, ESTs are “readily usable” as a
tool because they can be created and used in any research
setting or, alternatively, distributed to (or created by) any

154. Id. at 1381.
155. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 6.
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laboratory that wishes to make use of them.
Because ESTs would qualify as research tools, they would
be subject to the revised substantiality prong for utility. This
means that the products associated with ESTs, such as the
proteins encoded by the underlying gene or the underlying
gene itself, need not independently exhibit substantial use.
Only the ESTs themselves must exhibit “real world” use. As a
research tool usable in a laboratory setting for basic research
studying the genes and encoded proteins of the maize genome,
ESTs satisfy this standard.
The claimed ESTs satisfy the relaxed substantial use
prong for utility, but they must still exhibit specificity of use in
order to have patentable utility.
Under the revised
substantiality prong, “merely hypothetical” 156 assertions of
utility that represent what researchers may be able to do,
rather than what they have already proven, are sufficient as
long as they have a research context and correspond to a
specific use. Fisher’s ESTs have claimed uses that are
applicable to all ESTs as a group and are therefore general in
nature, rather than specific. The claimed uses, including as a
molecular marker or source for primers, apply to all ESTs
associated with the maize genome. Because of the extent of
generality of the claimed uses, they could actually apply to
any EST on any genome, not just the maize genome. The
generality of the claimed utilities results in Fisher’s ESTs
failing the specificity prong of the revised utility test. For this
reason, the claimed ESTs fail to exhibit the requisite utility
for patentability.
Fisher’s claimed ESTs fail the revised utility test, but not
all ESTs would necessarily fail the test.
ESTs could
potentially pass a revised utility test if the claimed utility was
specific to particular cDNA sequences being claimed, rather
than applicable to a general class of cDNAs. 157 An example of
a specific use would be using an EST to control the protein
expression of a specific protein A, rather than a general
assertion of controlling protein expression of an unknown
protein. Another example of a sufficiently specific use would
be using an EST corresponding to an underlying gene X to
locate the Y gene in either plant A or organism B, as opposed
to a general assertion of locating genetic molecules of other
156. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373.
157. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 51.
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plants and organisms.
C. APPLICATION OF REVISED UTILITY TEST TO OTHER
POTENTIAL RESEARCH TOOLS
1. Partially Characterized Proteins
Under the USPTO’s current Guidelines, which are based
on the Brenner utility test, partially characterized proteins are
generally unpatentable. 158 The revised Guidelines give an
example of a protein with a disclosed amino acid sequence and
a non-explicitly disclosed utility demonstrating that the
protein can “specifically bind with another protein X such that
X can be isolated and quantified.” 159 The asserted utility
qualifies as specific because it indicates that the claimed
protein will specifically bind to protein X. 160 However, under
the current utility test, the asserted utility lacks substantial
utility because there is no disclosed “real world” use since
further experimentation is needed to elucidate a use for the
claimed protein. 161
Under the revised utility test, such a partially
characterized protein would qualify as a research tool because
it is a “tool for discovery” that could be used, for example, to
learn the role of the claimed protein and protein X in the
context of a cell and to investigate their potential downstream
therapeutic uses.
Knowledge of such protein-protein
interactions would constitute a “broad, enabling invention . . . .
useful to many scientists” and would be readily usable and
distributable. 162 As a research tool, the claimed protein would
be subject to the relaxed substantial utility prong, which
would not require an immediate benefit to the public in
currently available form. 163 Using the partially characterized
protein in a research setting to better understand biological
processes would constitute a sufficient real world use to satisfy
utility. Therefore, unlike the current Brenner standard, the
proposed revised utility test would render partially
characterized proteins patentable as research tools.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
NIH Principles and Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,094.
Nelson, 626 F.2d at 856.
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2. Receptor Molecules
Similarly, under the current utility test, receptor
molecules are typically unpatentable for lack of utility. One
example illustrating this, given by the USPTO in its revised
Guidelines, is that of a claimed protein receptor A, which
binds to protein X of unknown identity, but has not been
characterized with regards to its biological function or role in
The asserted utility is for
any disease or condition. 164
“identifying materials that bind the receptor and the potential
use of such materials as therapeutics” and for producing a
monoclonal antibody that binds receptor A. 165
The hypothetical receptor A has sufficient specificity
under the Brenner utility test because the claimed uses,
identifying materials that bind only receptor A and making
antibodies that bind only receptor A, are not applicable to a
general class of receptor molecules. 166
In determining whether the substantial utility prong is
satisfied, the current utility test requires not only that
receptor A have substantial utility, but additionally that the
materials that bind receptor A and the antibody that binds
receptor A have substantial utility apart from that of receptor
A itself. 167 The method of identifying materials that bind
receptor A has an asserted therapeutic use to “effect control
over receptor A” that fails for lack of substantial utility since
“a method of treating an unspecified, undisclosed disease or
condition, does not define a ‘real world’ context of use.” 168 The
disclosed method of making an antibody for receptor A also
fails for lack of substantial utility for the same reason. 169
Since both the material that binds receptor A and the antibody
for receptor A lack substantial utility, receptor A fails the
Brenner utility test.
Under the proposed revised utility test, receptor A would
likely qualify as a research tool because it is a “tool for
discovery” to be used in researching diseases or conditions
related to the activity of the receptor, because it is a “broad,
enabling invention” useful to any scientist researching the role
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 63.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id; see Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535-36.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 65.
Id.
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of receptors generally or the specific role of receptor A in
various cellular processes, and because it is “readily useable or
distributable as a tool” by any researcher who could isolate the
protein in her laboratory from cellular extracts. As a research
tool, the receptor would be subject to the relaxed substantial
utility prong.
Under the revised utility test, receptor A would be
considered useful because it aids in the incremental discovery
process of understanding a disease mechanism, which would
constitute a substantial utility in that it serves to “eliminate
some possibilities and provide information to the research
process.” 170 Importantly, under the revised utility test it
would be unnecessary to separately determine the utility of
either the material that binds receptor A or the antibody for
receptor A since “studying the properties of the claimed
product itself or the mechanism in which the material is
involved” 171 would not be expressly excluded as a substantial
utility. Therefore, under a revised utility test, a receptor
molecule such as receptor A would not be denied patentability
as it would under the Brenner standard for lack of substantial
utility.
3. Large Chemical Groups
Large chemical groups are generally unpatentable for lack
of substantial use under the current utility test. An example
given by the USPTO in its revised Guidelines is that of a
claimed group of chemical compounds sharing a chemical
formula. 172 The hypothetical chemical compounds have no
asserted physical, chemical, or biological properties, and an
asserted use as biomedical research tools after the physical,
chemical, and biological properties are determined. 173 Under
the current utility test, there is no specific utility because all
chemical compounds can potentially be used for biomedical
research, so that the utility is general in nature. 174 The
hypothetical chemical group also lacks substantial utility
because biomedical research to determine the properties of the
compounds does not constitute a “real world” context of use,
since further research would be required to find a downstream

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1381 (Rader, J., dissenting).
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 65, at 6.
Id. at 71–74.
Id.
Id.
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application for the compounds once their properties were
discovered. 175
Under the proposed revised utility standard, the chemical
group would constitute a research tool because the primary
use would be as a “tool for discovery” in biomedical research,
which would be broad and enabling since it is a large chemical
group with many potential avenues for biomedical research,
and readily useable by a scientific laboratory in any way they
saw fit for their given avenues of research using the claimed
compounds. 176 As a research tool, the chemical group would
be subject to the revised substantial utility prong. It would
satisfy the substantial utility requirement since a “real world”
context would include utility as a tool in biomedical research.
However, the hypothetical chemical group would still fail
to be patentable under the revised test for lack of specificity.
Like Fisher’s claimed ESTs, the chemical group in this
example asserts a claimed utility (use in “biomedical
research”) that is broadly applicable to any chemical
compound. In order to have specific utility, the claimed
biomedical research use would need to pertain to a particular
chemical, physical, or biological property of the compound
group in order to distinguish it from any other chemical group.
Thus, under the revised utility test, large chemical groups
with no claimed biological, physical, or chemical properties
corresponding to their utility would fail the utility test as they
would under the current Brenner standard. Yet, in contrast to
their failed patentability under the Brenner standard, large
chemical groups with utility corresponding to specific
biological, physical, or chemical properties unique to the
claimed chemical group would be potentially patentable.
D. THE REVISED UTILITY TEST SATISFIES THE GOALS OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM
1. Potential Problems with the Revised Test
The proposed revised utility test would confer more
patents for research tools than are granted under the current
test. This raises concerns about lack of access causing a
biomedical anticommons, where upstream “clogging” of

175. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535-36.
176. See NIH Principles and Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,094.
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patents for research tools could lead to a decrease in
When access to important
downstream innovation. 177
research tools is impeded, there is a fear that research will be
delayed, stopped completely, or conducted without proper
authorization, thereby threatening to stifle valuable research
or beget future litigation over patent infringement. 178
Another concern is that a policy promoting more research tool
patents would unfavorably alter the balance between
rewarding the inventor and enhancing the public good by
giving too great a reward to inventors who have put little
effort into the discovery process 179 and “tip[ping] the economic
balance against drug development.” 180

177. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, in FOUND. OF
INTELL. PROP. 177, 178-79 (Robert P. Merges & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2004).
If too many patents are granted for biomedical research tools, the fear is that
a biomedical anticommons will come into existence. Rebecca Eisenberg and
Michael Heller assert that a “tragedy of the anticommons” comes into being
when multiple owners of patents each have the right to exclude others from a
scarce resource, leaving no one with effective access to the resource. An
anticommons is essentially a problem of access to research tools, but it is
more complex than the problem of under-use inherent in the patent system
in that each upstream patent “allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on
the road to product development, adding to cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovation.” Id.
178. See Brief for Eli Lilly and Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee
at 4, In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1465) (“[S]uch
claims [for EST patents], if granted, could be used to prevent, threaten to
prevent, or extract value from everything that might later be discovered
about genes and proteins associated with genetic sequences.”); Brief for
Genentech as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 12, In re Fisher, 421
F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1465) (“Patents issued on inventions that
are yet to be made are harmful to the biotechnology industry and the public,
because they effectively extinguish commercial interest in developing new
drugs or diagnostic products based on genomic information.”).
179. For example, patents for relatively easily-discovered research tools
such as ESTs might unjustly reward an inventor who expends little time or
energy in discovering the EST by conferring a monopoly that extends to
downstream product development that, in contrast, takes a great expenditure
of time, money, and effort.
180. JAMES D. WATSON, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE (2003) (“The large
royalties demanded by gene-finding monopolies tip the economic balance
against drug development; cloning a drug target is at most 1 percent of the
way to an approved drug.”).
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2. Solutions to Potential Problems with the Revised Test:
Narrow Patent Scope and User-Friendly Licensing
Agreements
Narrow patents for research tools and user-friendly
licensing agreements could limit potential problems associated
with a proliferation of upstream research tool patents causing
“clogging” that limits downstream innovation. Patents for
research tools should be narrow in scope so that they are
commensurate with what the invention actually is: a research
tool. The patent should not grant rights to downstream
inventions, such as therapeutic products that treat a disease,
A strictly
which will potentially be discovered later. 181
enforced specificity prong could provide a means of enforcing
narrow patents for research tools so that inventors would not
have broad claims outweighing the amount of work they put
into the discovery. For example, inventors who claim ESTs
with only a general use would not be entitled to a patent,
while inventors who expend greater effort to identify an
underlying gene or corresponding protein to distinguish it
from other ESTs would satisfy the specificity requirement and
deserve a patent (although it would still be narrow and apply
only to the EST in its capacity as a research tool).
Problems of access to patented research tools could also be
resolved with favorable licensing agreements or research
exemptions. 182 The biomedical research community is a
collaborative network including public research institutions,
small
private
biotechnology
companies
and
large
pharmaceutical companies, where a strong business
reputation is vital for the success of its members. Favorable
licensing agreements promote strong long-term business

181. Using ESTs as an example, a potential patent would not entitle the
patent holder to claim the entire full-length cDNA or the whole underlying
gene associated with the EST, but instead only the EST itself in its
applications as a research tool.
182. Several proposals to enable access to patented research tools include
exclusive licensing arrangements, nonexclusive licensing arrangements, and
research exemptions. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss these
options in depth.
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partnerships and have proved effective in the past for research
tools, such as PCR.
Upstream patent holders in the
biomedical research community would have a strong incentive
to encourage further development of their products because,
with narrow research tool patents, the ultimate pay-out would
come from separate patents for the therapeutically useful
pharmaceutical products that are created downstream.
Inventors unable to fully develop the downstream products
associated with their patented research tool would be likely to
license out use of the research tool (even without a broad
patent that confers rights to the downstream inventions)
because they gain a greater economic reward from fees
associated with licensing than from blocking access to a tool
they have no intent to develop. An inventor able and willing
to develop downstream products could block access to the tool
without detriment to the public because the downstream
innovation would still be taking place.
The tension between rewarding an inventor for her
contribution to society and contributing to the public good
with a beneficial invention is a dynamic tension that will
never be completely resolved, but licensing agreements and
narrow patent scope may provide a viable means of
approximating a balance between these two competing
interests.
CONCLUSION
Current controversy exists over the extent to which
upstream research tools, including ESTs, should be
patentable. The fear is that overbroad biomedical research
patents will cause upstream “clogging” that deters
downstream invention of vital therapeutic products. In In re
Fisher, the court addressed this issue by applying the
standard of usefulness required for patentable inventions
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to ESTs, finding that they were
unpatentable because they lacked the requisite specific and
substantial utility and were “only tools to be used along the
way in the search for a practical utility.” 183
The Fisher analysis reveals that the current test for
utility fails to address the importance of research tools in
modern biomedical research and poorly addresses the goals of
the patent system, thereby necessitating its revision. A new

183. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376.
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test should be adopted, which alters the substantiality prong
of the utility test in its application to research tools by
allowing a research use in a laboratory setting to constitute a
“real world” utility that is substantial. Such an altered utility
test, when combined with a narrow patent scope for research
tools and reasonable licensing schemes, would recognize the
significance of research tools in modern biomedical research
by adequately rewarding inventors while promoting the
“Progress of Science.” 184

184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

